

Afterthought

Without question, the heaviest burden of the Carrizal tragedy was borne by the family. Lotta struggled to restructure her life. She had lost her husband, her home, and her place in society but she held her young children close to her heart. All of my summers were spent in the Rye Beach house with my grandmother, and I stayed in the same bedroom that had been my mother's. I read in the same rocking chair in which she had been held in the arms of her aunt as they rocked through her hours of tears while listening to the same music box that my grandmother would wind up for me at bed time. My mother could never, ever, suppress her tears when talking to me about her father; I rarely asked her a question or mentioned his name. I did not see my uncle very often, as he served in the U.S. Army on posts with his family all over the country and the world. However, he did tell me, later, of incidents throughout his career, beginning at West Point, when his father's fellow officers would single him out with praise for his father and encouragement for him. I remember once his showing my grandmother letters he had written and replies he had received from authors of books and articles that blamed Boyd for being the cause of the disaster at Carrizal.

Lotta remarried in 1922. Her daughter, Eliza, graduated from Bryn Mawr College in 1930, eventually marrying and having a son and daughter. Meanwhile her son, Klemm, graduated from West Point in 1931, also marrying and having a son and daughter. Their mother never discussed the details of the Pershing investigation with them because she had promised to give up his investigation. She explained the verbal orders problem but nothing more. She supported her son's passionate resolve to follow in his father's

footsteps. She mourned the death in Vietnam of her eldest grandson, Major Richard Klemm Boyd Jr., who was killed in action serving as commander of Bravo Company of the Second Battalion in the 101st Airborne Division near Chulai in 1967. He was awarded a Silver Star, six Bronze Stars, one for valor and a Combat Infantry Badge. Lotta applauded the return of her other grandson, Captain John Tompkins from Vietnam in 1969. He served in the Armored Branch of the 25th Infantry Division. He was awarded a Silver Star, a Bronze Star for valor, a Bronze Star for meritorious service, an Air Medal and Two Purple Hearts. She would have followed the career of her great-grandson, Richard Tompkins Gustavson, with interest. He served as a military analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency. She died the year he was born.

Nearly half a century after Carrizal at the house in Rye Beach, Lotta and I talked one summer evening about those memories. I asked her how she had coped with so much. She slammed her clenched fist down with such force on the glass dining table that the porcelain and a vase of flowers jumped at least an inch before loudly settling down with a crash, “You do what you have to do when you have to do it!”

Another generation is speaking out now. It echoes the voices still heard from Boyd’s loyal and dedicated supporters. The Army does not yet accept the evidence presented. Writers continue to rely on mistaken secondary sources, myths and tales of the times without digging deep enough. History is damning the wrong man, the victim of the flaws of another. Pershing failed to start his war and then tried to bury his deception in another’s grave.

It is past the time to wake up, to recognize and accept the existing truths around us. We look to our leaders for competence, courage, determination and dedication to the

public faith. Can we trust ourselves to train and choose the very best to follow into the future? Can we rely on them? These are the questions that we should be asking.

Acknowledgements

From its inception my work has been inspired and encouraged by the memory of my grandmother, who passionately wanted the true story told. My uncle, Richard Klemm Boyd, enthusiastically offered his memories and records until his death in 2001. Peter Drummey, Stephen T. Riley Librarian at the Massachusetts Historical Society, understood the historical importance of the topic and offered endless, invaluable suggestions throughout. Mitchell Yockelson, Investigative Archivist, Office of the Inspector General, National Archives and Records Administration, tutored me in the techniques of record searching and offered suggestions for historical writing. I am very grateful to Louis R. Sadler and Charles H. Harris III, who have given me permission to use their material and to Stackpole Books, the heir of The Military Service Publishing Company, who has allowed me to quote from Col. Frank Tompkins' *Chasing Villa, The Story Behind the Story of Pershing's Expedition Into Mexico*. Serving as a major in the Thirteenth Cavalry at the time, he participated in many of the most exciting actions and witnessed firsthand verbal accounts of all others. He also knew Boyd well, was definite in his opinions about Carrizal, and staunchly defended Boyd's actions. I have drawn extensively from his remarkable study.

I thank also my friends who listened, reviewed, and generously gave me their time and helpful comments: Nelson Yuan-sheng Kiang, Walter Amory, Sally Durand, and, while he lived, my son, Rich, who patiently advised, contributed, and steered me on a road to reach our goal. His father assisted, as well, in many ways over the years, as did my daughter, Jenny, and my cousin, Barby, who shared our family papers and photographs and gave endless, inestimable support. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick A.

Stevens Jr. USA (Ret.) assisted with references. In addition, I sincerely appreciate all of the time and attention given by the staff of the reference department at the Duxbury Free Library in Duxbury, Massachusetts. They searched tirelessly and obtained for me books and historical material from libraries across the country. The staffs at the National Archives I and II and The Manuscript Division at The Library of Congress have patiently assisted with my numerous searches in addition to The Historical Services Division at The U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, The Special Collections Division at the USMA Library, West Point, NY, The Norwich University Archives and Special Collections, The Fort Huachuca Museum at Fort Huachuca, AZ, and The U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry. It was my good fortune to receive timely responses to all of my inquiries and requests and my reward to receive enriching information and evidence.

Last and most certainly, I offer a special tribute to the late Colonel Harold B. Wharfield, USAF (Ret.). His words were the beam lighting my path as I searched from the very beginning. In 1964 he published *The 10th Cavalry and Border Fights:*

Of all the engagements the 10th Cavalry has fought throughout the years, none has been more shrouded in mystery as to the orders and purpose than that at Carrizal, in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico on June 21st, 1916. The mission assigned to Capt. Charles T. Boyd had no meaning as a tactical military maneuver; it only makes sense when considered as involving some larger scheme.

—Colonel Harold B. Wharfield, *The 10th Cavalry and Border Fights*¹

¹ Wharfield, *The Tenth Cavalry and Border Fights*, 24.

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U.S. Army, Comptroller of The Army, *Strength of The Army: Army Military Personnel 1789-1956.*

Appendix A

Transcription of Captain Orlando C. Troxel's letter written to Mrs. Boyd. The original is in The Boyd Collection.

August 1, 1916.

I have questioned almost every man that has come in, and by piecing here and there, I have been able to get a fair idea of the whole thing. . . . It seems that Capt. Boyd's idea was to go through mounted and he formed line of mounted foragers, with "K" on the right and "C" astride of the road over which they were passing. After advancing some distance he came to a wire fence where he was forced to dismount and here it was that the Mexicans opened fire. "C" remained astride the road and had to pass over rather level open ground, while "K" was on the right and had ground rather covered with mesquite to pass over. "C" started to advance by rushes and moved right forward after delivering a few shots. On each side of this road was a machine gun which at once opened on them. "C" continued to advance and at about the 3rd rush - alternate firing and running forward - Capt. Boyd arrived at the irrigation ditch where the machine guns were located and from which the Mexicans first fire had been delivered. The Mexicans in front of "C" were apparently in full retreat at this time. Capt. Boyd had been twice wounded once in the hand and once in the arm. He was again urging his men forward when he was struck by a third bullet and killed instantly. Everyone testifies to his instant death. Although his men in his immediate vicinity followed him beautifully and could not have done better, when he fell and with the 1st Sergeant (Winrow) and Q. M. Sergt. (Farrier) both wounded, the former three times in the leg and latter in the right arm, the men in that part of "C" had no leader and I do not believe they advanced much further. Hank, however, with the men on his flank advanced clear through the town, but with the arrival of re-inforcements from Villa Ahumada and the shortage of ammunition on their persons, they were falling back to refill their belts when Hank, too, was killed. Capt. Boyd, although twice wounded had just finished calling up his wounded 1st Sergeant and Q. M. Sergeant (He had previously ordered them to the rear) and told them to come to the irrigating ditch for water and to cleanse their wounds, and he with his men were to move forward again when the end came. After each conference, he would go back and talk to his men and say such things as I have heard him repeat many times, as for instance: "The only way I know how to obey an order is to carry it out", etc., etc. He asked his men "to stay by him to the last" and "not to turn their backs", etc., etc., and all stories tell how well his men followed him. They could not have done better. The 1st Sergeant was killed later but the Q. M. Sergeant is still in the Hospital and I have been unable to get his story.

Captain Morey is unable to give any information of "C" Troop's part (or Capt. Boyd's) after the firing began. We had so much hoped for authentic details from him... The right of the line did not advance with "C" and finally the little band on the left was surrounded by the reinforcements...Capt. Boyd's conduct and that of Hank and the men of "C" was perfectly beautiful. Capt. Boyd's was the directing mind. He knew his understanding of his orders and he knew no flinching. Putting that confidence in him which we all had, they followed him and those who had any leader to keep that spirit alive pushed on.

Appendix B

Transcription of the report of the inspector general of the Punitive Expedition, Lieutenant Colonel George C. Cress, regarding the battle of Carrizal. Also a Xeroxed copy of the signed deposition of Quarter Master Sergeant Dalley Farrior—one of the seventy-four depositions attached to the report. Pershing's final memorandum is included. All documents are in the Record Files of the Office of the Adjutant General War Department Section, National Archives, RG 94.

HEADQUARTERS PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, U.S. ARMY,
Camp Dublan, Mexico, June 30, 1916.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

On June 17th, the following verbal instructions were given to Captain Charles T. Boyd, Tenth Cavalry, to guide him in the conduct of a reconnaissance to be made in the direction of Ahumada:

“A large concentration of Carrancista troops is reported in the vicinity of Ahumada, on the Mexican Central Railroad. Information has been received that this force is being assembled to attack our line of communications in conjunction with other de facto forces from Pearson and Nueva Casas Grandes. Take your troop and reconnoiter in the direction of Ahumada and obtain as much information as you can regarding the forces there. This is a reconnaissance only, and you will not be expected to fight. In fact, I want you to avoid a fight if possible. Do not allow yourself to be surprised by superior numbers. But if wantonly attacked, use your own judgment as to what you shall do, having due regard for the safety of your command.”

I then went on to tell Captain Boyd of General Trevino's order to attack our troops if we should send them east, west or south. I mentioned the strained relations existing here at the time. And further told him it would not be wise to go into any place garrisoned by Carrancista troops, as he might be caught in an embarrassing situation; also that upon his arrival at some of the numerous ranches in the direction of Ahumada he should be able to obtain the information sought.

Practically the same instructions given Captain Boyd were immediately afterwards briefly telegraphed to the Commanding Officer, Ojo Federico for the guidance of a patrol of a troop of cavalry to be sent out from that place on the following day in the direction of Ahumada. The following is a copy of the telegram sent to the Commanding Officer, Ojo Federico:

Dublan, Mexico
June 17, 1916
Major Saffarans,
Ojo Federico.

Send one troop cavalry through Sabinal to Vado de Santa Maria on the Santa Maria river to reconnoiter from there in the direction of Ahumada period It is reported a large force Mexican troops is assembling at Ahumada and it is

desired to get information as to their numbers and movements period This is a reconnaissance only and not for the purpose of bringing on a fight period It is understood General Trevino has given orders to all his troops to fire on our detachments moving out from our line of communications period One troop Tenth Cavalry leaves here tomorrow moving toward Ahumada on a similar mission period It is not known whether wagons can be taken beyond Santa Maria period The troop should take every precaution against surprise period If any large force is seen prompt report should be made of it period Answer. CABELL”

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

starting at p. 58

1. Circumstances leading to the encounter:

Capt. Chas. T. Boyd, Troop C, 10th Cavalry, and Capt. L. S. Morey, Troop K, 10th Cavalry were each ordered by the Commanding General, Punitive Expedition to make reconnaissances, from their respective stations, in the direction of Ahumada. There was no cooperation between these troops ordered by the Commanding General, Punitive Expedition

Capt. Boyd, on the arrival of Capt. Morey at Santo Domingo ranch, 5 p. m., June 20, believed he should assume command of both troops and it was so agreed, although Capt. Morey did not consider his orders required this, nor did he agree with Capt. Boyd in the interpretation of his orders.

By assuming command of both, troops, Capt. Boyd assumed responsibility for the further conduct and completion of the missions assigned both troops, and when Capt. Morey placed himself under command of Capt. Boyd, it devolved upon him to loyally obey such orders as he might receive.

Carrizal about 8 miles from Santo Domingo ranch, is on the usually traveled road between Santo Domingo ranch and Ahumada, the latter town being 20 miles from Santo Domingo ranch,. There are roads to Ahumada both north and south of Carrizal the one north being called the automobile road and being about a mile shorter than the road thru Carrizal. Capt. Boyd decided, before leaving Santo Domingo ranch, to go thru Carrizal.

Upon arriving at the irrigation ditch one mile west of Carrizal, Capt., Boyd sent a message into Carrizal asking permission to pass thru the town on his way to Ahumada. He first had a conference with Mexican officer, supposed to be Lt. Col. Rivas, who informed Capt. Boyd of the orders he had from General Trevino—not to allow American troops to pass east, west, or south—and that he would have to carry out his orders. Later Capt. Boyd had a conference with Gen. Gomez, senior officer in command, who likewise refused this permission.

While these conferences were in progress, the American troops were advancing east across the open flat towards the southwest edge of Carrizal, where the Mexican troops, mounted and dismounted, were deployed and where they had been forming since the American troops first crossed the west irrigation ditch. After the last conference, the American troops were dismounted to fight on foot; the led horses were sent to the rear, and the troops advanced, with their rifles loaded and at a ready, towards the Mexican line. When within about 200 yards of this line, the Mexicans opened fire and the encounter began.

2. Conduct of the action against the Mexican forces:

In the orders received to make a reconnaissance, both troop commanders were informed there was a large concentration of troops reported in the vicinity of Ahumada.

While resting at Santo Domingo ranch on the afternoon of June 20, four soldiers from Carrizal appeared at the ranch, and Capt. Boyd had opportunity to get some information relative to the garrisons at Carrizal and Ahumada. These four soldiers also had opportunity to gain valuable military information concerning the American troops. He also learned of the presence of troops at both of these towns thru the ranch foreman, who had a few days previous visited these towns.

There appeared to be no doubt of the fact that the four soldiers who appeared at Santo Domingo ranch on June 20 and those reported to be at Carrizal and Ahumada were part of the organized forces of the De Facto government, which had recently issued orders to fire upon American troops going east, west, or south.

On the other hand, we were at the same time occupying Mexican territory with the sanction and approval of the same Mexican government, and were supposed to be having their cooperation in the search for Villistas. At this particular time our relations with the Mexican government were somewhat strained, but this fact made it all the more necessary for the Commanding General and his subordinates to keep in touch with affairs and to be advised of any concentrations of Mexican forces, whether Villistas or Carrancistas, that might endanger the expeditionary force. Being on supposedly friendly terms with this De Facto government, our troops were being constantly warned and ordered not to fire unless being fired upon, a condition that is fundamentally and thruout entirely wrong and one to which the Government should not subject its soldiers.

In the month of April, an American force in a Mexican town was fired upon by Mexican troops representing this De Facto government and the American commander retreated. There had been more or less comment among the troops pertaining to the Punitive Expedition as to the wisdom of thus retreating and many opinions were expressed indicating the belief that one American was the equal of quite a number of Mexicans and that had our troops taken the offensive in the incident referred to, the Mexicans would have given way and the result would have been not only success in the military encounter but that the lesson to the Mexicans would have been such as to establish our prestige with them. There is no doubt but that many officers and men were

very firmly impressed with the truth of such statements, very much influenced thereby, and in several cases, by acting upon these impressions, they had passed thru towns going east, south, and west, and had met with no resistance beyond that of remonstrance.

This command consisted of two troops colored cavalry and three officers. After arriving at the irrigation ditch near Carrizal, there was an interval of probably one and one-half hours before the encounter with the Mexicans took place. There is a mile wide open flat between the irrigation ditch and the southwest corner of Carrizal. During this time and while the conferences were taking place, there was every indication of military activity along the edge of Carrizal, in which were seen mounted and dismounted Mexican soldiers. The American troops were moved forward during this period, first in line of platoon columns; next deployed as foragers with right platoon of Troop K in column and echeloned to rear. About this time the commanding officer ordered Capt. Morey to protect his right flank and Lt. Adair his left flank, and again changed his plans for entering the town. The Mexicans in position were occupying a line that at this time overlapped the American right. About 400 yards from the Mexican line, the formation was again changed; the troops dismounting to fight on foot, led horses of Troop C taken directly to the rear of this troop and those of Troop K sent to join them; there was no guard for the led horses; one non-commissioned officer with the led horses of the two troops; Troop C had 24 men on the firing line, 15 horseholders, 2 men guard for the pack train and 2 packers; Troop K had 26 men on the firing line, 1 trumpeter, and 10 horseholders. Mr. E. B. Fuller, owner of Santo Domingo ranch and who visited Carrizal to disinter the bodies of Americans, states Col. Rivas's command consisted of 100 mounted men; Maj. Velardez's command of 165, part of them cavalry, and that Gen. Gomez had brought 50 dismounted men from Ahumada; total, 315. There were no reserves and no rendezvous announced or instructions given as to a later assembling of the command.

All these points are mentioned in detail as a possible indication of the mental attitude of the commanding officer and the estimate he placed upon the relative military efficiency of the Mexican soldiers.

The troops advanced dismounted, until fire was opened by the Mexicans, whose line at this time covered the front of Troop C and extended south beyond Troop K front. A large part of the Mexican cavalry was mounted and in lane directly in front of Troop C; other mounted men were along the edge of the trees south of this lane. Troop C advanced rapidly by rushes and drove the Mexicans from their front. The advance of Troop C soon carried them into the trees, where they would subsequently be hidden from the view of Troop K. Lt. Adair with four of his men crossed the east irrigation ditch, the other nine did not cross the ditch; three of Capt. Boyd's; first platoon joined Lt. Adair, after he had crossed this ditch. There is no evidence of any other men crossing. It is believed Capt. Boyd was killed very early in the action, before he had reached the east irrigation ditch, probably within 15 minutes after fire opened, and when struck, was practically alone. The other men of both platoons apparently scattered, after they entered the woods, and there appeared to be no cohesion, the men fighting mostly as individuals. Troop K with an interval, gained apparently by endeavoring to protect the right flank, too large to admit

of cooperation between the two troops, advanced but a short distance to a slight depression and there remained firing at the Mexicans, who were returning the fire from their position on the left front, front, and right front. K Troop remained in this position, according to the testimony, about 35 minutes, with casualties of one officer wounded, three enlisted men killed, seven wounded, and then retreated towards the northwest, to the irrigation ditch, passing over the ground over which Troop C advanced, a few men of Troop C joining those of Troop K. After the retreat began, there was no longer any military formation or control. Capt. Morey's efforts to assemble the men failed, and from this time on the men became dispersed and either made their way back towards camp or were captured.

3. Behavior of members of command during the action and subsequent thereto:

When the Regimental Commander, 10th Cavalry, was directed to send a troop of cavalry in the direction of Ahumada, he designated Capt. Chas. T. Boyd, Troop C, for this duty.

When the Commanding Officer, Ojo Federico, was instructed to send a troop from his command on a similar mission, he directed Capt. L. S. Morey, then commanding the three troops 10th Cavalry at this station, to designate the troop. Capt. Morey, although alone with his troop, and unfamiliar with the country in the direction of Ahumada detailed himself for this duty.

These two commands, with missions assigned separately to each, met at Santo Domingo ranch, and Capt. Boyd, the senior officer, assumed command. On the evening of June 20, the officers of the command held a conference, at which the interpretation of the orders received and the plans for the following day were discussed. Guide Spilsbury and Mr. McCabe, a foreman at Santo Domingo ranch, were present during part of this conference. Capt. Boyd appeared to be of the opinion that his orders required him to pass thru the town of Carrizal, although there were roads both north and south of Carrizal, and no physical obstacles to prevent his avoiding this town, and he further appeared to believe if there were any Carrancista soldiers present in Carrizal, they would not offer any material resistance. Lt. Adair appeared to hold the same view. Capt. Morey differed with Capt. Boyd in the interpretation of their orders, and he, together with Guide Spilsbury and Mr. McCabe, disagreed also as to the resistance the organized forces reported to be in Carrizal would offer, in case the attempt were made to pass thru. (Capt. Boyd joined his troop in the field May 22; Capt. Morey joined latter part of March; and Lt. Adair came into Mexico with the 10th Cavalry.)

There was no evidence that any feeling existed between the officers of this command, as result of their not agreeing as to the interpretation of their orders and their attitude towards the military efficiency of the Mexican soldiers, and Mr. McCabe states: "Capt. Morey told Capt. Boyd that it was his judgment not to try to force his way thru the town, but that he was absolutely under Capt. Boyd's orders, would go into the town first, or would go in alone, if Capt. Boyd ordered him to."

After the command arrived at the irrigation ditch west of Carrizal, Capt. Boyd, the officer in command conferred with the Mexican commander, the other officers remaining with their commands. The final instructions, according to Capt. Morey's statement and the affidavits of men of both troops, were for K Troop to look out for the right flank. Capt. Morey and Guide Spilsbury further state that he, Capt. Boyd, said, "he would send Lt. Adair thru the town."

When fire opened, a large part of the Mexican cavalry was directly in front of Troop C, with dismounted men at the entrance to the lane and along the west and south edges of trees and along the irrigation ditch near Carrizal. A machine gun either in the lane or close to it on the south side. There is nothing to indicate any overlapping of the left flank of Troop C. Many affidavits and sworn statements declare that K Troop right flank was well overlapped by the Mexican line before fire opened, and that when fire opened, this troop was halted on line with C Troop, and that it received fire from the trees to the south of the lane, from the irrigation ditch to the right, and from the right. Troop K made an advance of from 15 to 25 yards, Capt. Morey between the platoons, to an old roadbed that offered some shelter. Capt. Morey next noticed that Troop C had gone up or quite disappeared in the trees in the edge of the town, that the enemy was advancing in the open on his right, and that about this time he was shot. The first sergeant, commanding first platoon, twice called out that he could not hold his position longer. The casualties in this platoon, strength 13 men, at this time, so far as can be ascertained, were two men killed, five wounded, and Sgt. Page a very slight wound left forearm, total ~8.

At this time Troop K was receiving fire from both flanks and from its front, and Capt. Morey decided that it would be suicidal to remain or to endeavor to advance, and ordered retreat towards the northwest, where there appeared to be some cover. Capt. Morey thinks he retreated with 18 or 20 men. The affidavits of men in his troop indicate that the men did not leave the firing line together and from this time on, there was no formation and no control. Upon arriving at the ditch, Capt. Morey fell from exhaustion. That his condition was such is testified to in many statements of his own men and those of Troop C who saw him. He appears to have made an effort to assemble the men near him at the ditch, but without succeeding. No doubt Capt. Morey and the enlisted men of both troops who retreated in the direction of the ditch, and afterwards dispersed, were impressed with the seriousness of their position in an enemy's country, being about 90 miles from their supporting troops, their mounts and pack animals with canteens, rations, and extra ammunition gone. Capt. Morey, after failing to assemble the scattered troopers and with seven men, three of whom were wounded, moved towards the west about 2000 yards, where he found an old lime kiln. Being unable to go further, he told these men he would remain there and for them to do as they pleased. The man wounded in the knee and three of his own troop remained with him. They were without shelter, food, or water. At dark, all but the wounded man started toward the west. Neither Capt. Morey nor any of the others had strength to assist the wounded man. After going about a mile and a-half and being unable to go any further, Capt. Morey having given his field glasses, his map, and a message to these three men, ordered them to leave him, which they did. After resting, Capt. Morey regained sufficient strength to continue on to Santo Domingo ranch,

and from there made his way to Maj. Howze's command, which he joined about 1 A.M. June 25.

Troop C, after the Mexicans opened fire on them, advanced most gallantly and courageously, the officers leading. Lt. Adair's platoon seeming to advance faster than the right platoon, which, with Capt. Boyd leading, moved towards the machine gun near which Capt. Boyd was killed. The chief of the first platoon was wounded on the first or second advance. The Mexicans in this front were principally cavalry, still mounted when fire opened, and seem to have retreated quickly across the east irrigation ditch. All of C Troop men did not go beyond the trees, but kept up the fire individually, until they saw their way to escape. Lt. Adair, with four men of his platoon, crossed the east irrigation ditch, and later they were joined by three men from the first platoon. The spirit shown by these seven men and by Capt. Boyd and Lt. Adair seemed most commendable.

When the two troops were dismounted to fight on foot, the led horses and pack mules were assembled in rear of Troop C and were approximately 600 yards distant when the Mexicans opened fire. There was one horseholder and some animals wounded. The wounded animals, the loose pack mules crowding into the columns, the noise of firing and the excitement of the men, started the stampede. There appears to be unmistakable evidence that a body of Mexican cavalry came out of the trees to the left of Troop C and opened fire on the led horses, thereby increasing the disorder. Corpl. Green, the only non-commissioned officer with the led horses, claims that he was on the firing line and not ordered to take charge of the led horses until fire opened and that it was then too late to get the men together. They retreated singly and in two's and three's to the ranch at Santo Domingo, 7 miles to the rear. The evidence seems strong that they were followed some distance by the Mexicans and that when Corpl. Green sent two men out from the ranch towards Carrizal they saw Mexicans approaching. After this report, instead of making a stand at the ranch as had been suggested, all those who had not already started, left for the camps from which they had started.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Circumstances leading to the encounter:

That in carrying out his mission Capt. Chas. T. Boyd, 10th Cavalry, did not obey the instructions given him by the Commanding General, Punitive Expedition, and that in failing to do so and in assuming command of Troop K, 10th Cavalry, he became responsible for the encounter between the American troops and the forces of the De Facto government at Carrizal, June 21, 1916.

This conclusion is based upon the following:

That he was warned by the Commanding General that his mission was a reconnaissance only; that he was not expected to fight; that he was to avoid a fight if possible; that he must not allow himself to be surprised by superior numbers; that he was told it would not be wise to go into a town garrisoned by Carrancista soldiers; and that he

should be able to obtain the information sought, from the numerous ranches along the road.

2. Conduct of the action against the Mexican forces:

That the commanding officer of the American forces, after having arrived at his decision to pass thru Carrizal, underestimated the strength of the Mexicans and appeared to be of the opinion either that a show of force on his part would result in the Mexicans allowing him to pass thru the town unmolested or, that if there were any opposition, it would be very slight.

This conclusion is drawn from the following facts:

That he failed to make the usual preparations for a fight; that his led horses were left directly behind his rear, with no guard and with no one in charge capable of handling them in an emergency; that with 50 men on his firing line he advanced in the open to within about 200 yards of probably 300 armed Mexicans, many, of whom were occupying a strong defensive position.

3. Behavior of members of command during the action and subsequent thereto:

That the behavior of Capt. C. T. Boyd and of Lt. Adair in advancing Troop C towards the Mexican's was conspicuously brave and courageous; that the behavior of the troop was all that could be expected under the circumstances, the behavior of the seven men with Lt. Adair being especially commendable; that with the Mexicans covering his front and both flanks, Capt. Morey with Troop K could not advance without further endangering and jeopardizing his command; that after Troop K had left the firing line and was retreating, the men were in disorder and Capt. Morey had lost control; that, this state of affairs was due, in so far, as it directly concerned the enlisted men of Troop K, to the following:

- the strength of the enemy and the direction of their fire;
- the casualties sustained, particularly in the first platoon;
- the effect produced upon the troop by the first sergeant, commanding right platoon, twice calling to his troop commander that he couldn't remain where he was; and, in so far as it directly concerned the troop commander, to the following;

- the influences mentioned above as effecting the enlisted men;
- the wound he received, with the pain, loss of blood and shock which resulted therefrom;

- the loss of physical and mental power, incident to his wound and to the strain upon him during the fight, and to a realization of his position, in the enemy's country, 90 miles from reinforcements, with the enemy surrounding him, his mounts and rations gone and very little ammunition left, Capt. Boyd dead and only a few stragglers appearing to be left out of Troop C;

- that the casualties in Troop C occurred in the early stages of the fight;

that Lt. Adair with his men had disappeared across the east irrigation ditch near Carrizal and that when Troop K retreated across the ground over which Troop C had advanced, the few men left were either in the woods, or making their way to the rear;

that the wounded man of Troop C in the lime kiln with Capt. Morey was unable to walk and that neither Capt. Morey nor the men with him had the physical strength necessary to assist him; that there was no time when Capt. Morey could have returned to rescue him, and that early on the morning of June 25, he found his way to Major Howze's camp and reported the matter;

that the first fire from the Mexicans struck at least one horseholder, some of the pack mules and led horses, starting a stampede;

that shortly after the first fire, Mexican cavalry appeared around the left flank of Troop C, moving towards the led horses;

that the horseholders were demoralized and left the field in disorder and confusion as quickly as possible, pack train and all, riding back to Santo Domingo ranch; and that they very soon thereafter left for their camps;

that could these horseholders have been assembled at the Santo Domingo ranch, where there were supplies of ammunition, rations, and water, they could, it is believed, have been able to protect themselves and would have provided a rendezvous for uncaptured survivors of the fight.

Owing to the peculiar conditions that existed on the battle field with respect to the led horses; to the fact that while leading other horses these horseholders could not use their weapons; that they were followed, some distance, by Mexican cavalry, thus preventing their halting to link horses and make a stand, and to the fact that the only non-commissioned officer with them had not the rank or natural ability required to meet an emergency like this one, it is believed no steps should be taken looking to the punishment of these horseholders.

4. Any other circumstances connected with this engagement:

None.

5. Recommendations: That no further action be taken

#1

State of Chihuahua)
 Camp U. S. Troops) SR.
 Colonia Lubian, Mex.)

Personally appeared before me the undersigned authority, one, Dalloy Ferris, C.S. Sergeant, Troop C, 10th Cavalry, who being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says, concerning the engagement between American troops commanded by Capt. Charles T. Boyd, 10th Cavalry, and Carranza troops near Ahucada, Mexico, on June 21st, 1916, that "when we arrived near Carrizal, the Captain had us load our rifles and pistols. He baited and sent a messenger in to ask permission to pass thru the town. When the messenger returned several Mexicans came with him, and they halted at our point. The Captain went forward and talked to them. He returned to us and said that "it looked favorable, but we could only go north." He said his orders were to go east, and he meant to go that way. By this time the general of the Carranza troops had come out and the Captain went forward to talk to him. When he returned he said the general had given us permission to go thru the town, but we would go thru as foragers. As we formed line of foragers, the general called him back again. Then he returned he said he would execute fight on foot and advance in that formation. He did this and ordered no man to fire until fired upon. As we moved forward E Troop was on the right and C on the left. The Captain cautioned Sergeant Wierow, who commanded the right of C Troop to keep his men on a zigzag line. The Mexicans during this time had formed a line to our front about 200 yards away and opened fire on us. We laid down and fired back. Then we advanced by rushes. On the second rush I was wounded in the right arm, and stood where I was. The line I had been on kept moving forward. On their third rush they reached the Mexican's first line of defense, where there were two machine guns. At this time Captain Boyd had been shot in the head and shoulder. Sergeant Wierow had been wounded in the leg and Sergeant Abbott had also been wounded in the knee. The Captain tried to get E Troop, which was in our rear, to move up to us. He was shot and killed at this time. About 1000 had come with his men and was out of sight. Captain Hovey, said to assemble E Troop on him and we would all surrender. But several men of C Troop reconstituted with Capt. Hovey and induced him to make towards an adobe house in our left rear, where we could possibly make a stand. Capt. Hovey was very weak from loss of blood and fainting once. From here I finally made my way to the Santa Bernarda Ranch. From here I finally reached the 11th Cavalry about a mile west of San Luis.

Further deponent sayeth not.

Dalloy Ferris
 C.S. Sergeant, Troop C, 10th Cavalry.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27 day of June 1916.

Chas. Young
 Major, 10th Cavalry, Summary Court.

1st Ind.

Headquarters Punitive Expedition, U.S. Army, Dublan, Mex. August 31, 1916
To Commanding General, Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

1. This report of the investigation made by Lieutenant Colonel George C. Cress, Inspector General's Department, of the encounter between Troops C and K, 10th Cavalry, under Captain William T. Boyd and Mexican troops of the de facto government, under Lieutenant Colonel Rivas, at Carrizal June 21, 1916, is very full and complete. Every phase of the occurrence has been covered and doubtful points cleared up as far as it seems possible to do so.

2. Attention should first be invited to the fact that this expedition having entered Mexico in pursuit of bandits, through the courtesy of the Mexican government, the de facto forces, in firing on our troops under these circumstances, committed a deliberate act of war. In declaring, through the military commander at Chihuahua, that the American forces were to be attacked under certain conditions, the Mexican government accentuated its own responsibility in the premises. So serious were the consequences believed to be that many did not think the de facto troops would risk committing such an overt act. Possibly this view may have had its effect on Captain Boyd's mind, although there is no evidence to indicate that the thought ever occurred to him. Whether or not this is true, and regardless of Captain Boyd's attitude, the Mexican government itself was entirely responsible for the opposition offered to Captain Boyd's progress and, finally, for the culminating act of open hostility to the United States which started the fight at Carrizal.

3. With reference to Captain Boyd's action, I had known him a number of years, although not intimately, and considered him a capable and cautious officer who would faithfully carry out any orders he might receive. In giving him instructions regarding this reconnaissance, I told him, among other things, that the Mexican situation was very tense, and that a clash with Mexican troops would probably bring on war and for this reason was to be avoided. I pointed out to him that the country to the east was uninhabited and that he might have to go as far as Santo Domingo Ranch, a distance of about sixty-five miles, to get reliable information regarding the Mexican forces. I told him that at such a distance, should he clash with the de facto troops, it would be impossible for me to support him. After my conversation with him, I felt confident that Captain Boyd fully understood the importance and delicacy of his mission. No one could have been more surprised or chagrined than I was to learn that he had become so seriously involved.

4. Due to failure of our aeroplanes and the impossibility of verifying through native or other reliable sources the reported presence in the vicinity of Ahumada of 8,000 to 10,000 de facto troops, who had threatened to move against our line of communications, there was no other recourse than to send cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction. The hostile de facto commands at Ahumada and Carrizal were in a very advantageous position from which to strike our line at either Dublan or El Valle before we could concentrate at either place to meet them, unless by obtaining timely information we could

anticipate their intentions. Under similar circumstances it had been necessary on several previous occasions to send cavalry as far as ninety miles away.

5. In view of the detailed instructions given to Captain Boyd, the reasons for his action remain more or less a mystery. His decision to push on through Carrizal can be explained only on the hypothesis that, for some reason or other, he thought the Mexican troops would not fight, or that if they did fight he could easily brush them aside. In this view he was probably largely influenced by Lieutenant Adair's opinion. But it is even more difficult to comprehend why, after reaching the outskirts of Carrizal and talking to General Gomez and seeing the large number of Mexican troops moving into position in his front and towards his flanks, Captain Boyd should have still adhered to his determination to go on. He surely must have seen that he was outnumbered and, if he thought there was going to be a fight, he could hardly have failed to foresee the dire consequences to his command in case of defeat. As to his mission, Captain Boyd had already obtained at Santo Domingo ranch the information sought. Captain Morey had pointed out that his own orders did not contemplate going to any place occupied by de facto troops.

6. Arriving immediately in front of the Mexican position, his own command in an open plain, with mounted Mexican troops on his flanks within close range, it was a serious error to start a fight at all, but especially was it fatal to dismount to fight on foot under such disadvantage. Even though Captain Boyd had been directed to fight his way through to Ahumada, he would not have been in any way justified in deploying at close range and engaging such a strong defensive position. But, every circumstance, from the time he arrived at Santo Domingo Ranch, up to the time he gave the command to fight on foot, including the note he wrote while there reporting that he had been to Ahumada and was on his way back, point to the conclusion that in Captain Boyd's mind there was slight probability of a fight.

7. As to the conduct of the fight, there is little that can be said in approval. The deployment was made very near the enemy's lines without cover or protection of any sort, and, under the orders given, the two troops from the start advanced along divergent lines. The right flank under Captain Morey, soon left in the air, was partially surrounded and turned, and, Morey being wounded together with several others, that part of the line gave way, broke and scattered. Boyd's own troop, urged on by himself and the dashing Adair, pressed forward into the town, but was itself soon decimated, several of its numbers were captured, and the attack failed.

8. The troopers in charge of the lead horses were left, in the first instance, in an impossible position. Later, after the fight started, they were ordered further to the rear, receiving a rather heavy fire during this movement, and, having no responsible person in charge, the horses became stampeded and the horseholders never recovered anything like an organized formation. The scattered groups of horseholders, pursued by superior forces of Mexicans, could hardly be expected to assemble. Under the circumstances, unfortunate as they were, it is not believed that any disciplinary action is indicated as advisable.

There is no reliable evidence obtainable to sustain charges against any individual or group of these men for their conduct.

9. Notwithstanding the disaster resulting from this encounter, it must be said to the credit of this little body of men that they fought well as long as their officers remained alive to lead them and for some time after. The Mexican casualties were forty-two killed and fifty-one wounded, and thirty-seven horses killed. If Captain Boyd's force could have maintained cohesion among its parts, the results would probably have been far different. Too much praise cannot be given Boyd and Adair for personal courage in their gallant fight against overwhelming odds in which both died like the brave American soldiers they were.

John J. Pershing,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Commanding